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Abstract 
This paper has two aims. A specific goal is to examine the determinants of protection policy in Turkey. A 
second, broader goal is to test the recent insights of the political economy models of trade policy and 
assess their contribution to the empirical investigation of associations between protection rate and 
industry characteristics. The paper develops a stylized model with the broad common features of trade 
policy models. Estimation of the model with Turkish data from the 1980s lends support to the framework 
and confirms a number of key theoretical insights. The results are also useful from a policy perspective 
because they shed light on key factors that underlie policymakers' choices. In particular, we find that the 
risk-mitigating role of trade barriers is an important factor driving government policy. The finding 
implies that continued move toward openness to international trade require progress in fiscal systems or 
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1. Introduction 
This paper has two aims. A specific goal is to examine the determinants of protection policy in 
Turkey. A second, broader goal is to test the recent insights of the political economy models of trade 
policy and assess their contribution to the empirical investigation of associations between protection rate 
and industry characteristics. The paper develops a stylized model with the broad common features of 
trade policy models. Estimation of the model with Turkish data from the 1980s lends support to the 
framework and confirms a number of key theoretical insights. The results are also useful from a policy 
perspective because they shed light on key factors that underlie policymakers' choices.  
A key common result of the new political economy models of trade policy is that import 
penetration and price elasticity of import demand act as weights in the relationship between an industry's 
protection rate and its political characteristics (Helpman, 1995; Esfahani and Mahmud, 1999).
1 To be 
specific, in equations determining protection rates, the factors that influence policymakers' preferences 
over industry rents should enter as interactive terms with inverse import penetration and inverse import 
demand elasticity with respect to price. The reasons for this pattern are simple: Higher import penetration 
rates indicate smaller shares of domestic output relative to demand, hence smaller total rents received by 
the industry for any given rise in trade barriers. Higher import elasticities mean that the deadweight 
losses of trade distortions are larger and the value of rents generated through policy must be weighed 
against larger aggregate losses. We find that adhering to the specification prescribed by theory 
substantially improves the explanatory power of industry characteristics in our econometric work on 
Turkish data.  
Studies of trade policy have also offered a variety of ideas about the connection between and 
industry's economic and political characteristics and the politicians' eagerness to grant protection to the 
industry. In cases of most industry characteristics, there is no unanimity about the mechanisms at work or 
even about the direction of the effect (see the discussion in section 3 below). Empirical work has also 
produced mixed results in many cases, making it difficult to discriminate among theories (Rodrik, 1995). 
The improved specification of the trade policy model that we offer in this paper guides us toward more 
specific ideas. While we consider a wide range of views about the role of industry characteristics, the 
results that emerge suggest that the risk-mitigating role of trade barriers is an important factor driving 
government policy. This finding is particularly supported by evidence that the politicians' preference for 
creating rents through trade policy declines when they have access to more direct channels of providing 
                                                       
1 For surveys of the literature on the political economy of trade policy, see Hillman (1989), Magee (1994), Helpman 
(1995), and Rodrik (1995).   
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insurance to firms and workers, such as state ownership of enterprises. The evidence may seem to go 
against the common perception that interventionist governments tend to impose greater controls on both 
trade and domestic firms. But, there would be no contradiction if social insurance as a concern of 
policymakers becomes more central when private markets and institutions of risk management are 
weaker. Governments perceiving major imperfections in the risk market have an incentive to both build 
higher trade walls and intervene in domestic production, relying more on one in some industry and on the 
other in the rest. In other words, the two mechanisms may be imperfect substitutes. Indeed, this idea has 
been convincingly demonstrated by Rodrik (1998) who shows that more open economies build larger 
governments as a means of insurance against external risk.  
In terms of methodology, our study builds on two recent attempts to apply the seminal theoretical 
contribution of Grossman and Helpman (1994) to a cross-industry analysis of non-tariff barrier (NTB) 
coverage ratio in the US. Both studies—Goldberg and Maggi (forthcoming) and Gawande and 
Bandyopadhyay (forthcoming), henceforth GM and GB, respectively—focus on the role of organized 
lobbies on trade policy formation and show that the impact of import penetration on protection rate is 
conditioned on whether the industry is a major contributor to political campaigns or not. Both studies use 
the four-digit industry data set developed by Trefler (1993) and complement it with import demand 
elasticity estimates from Shiells, Stern, and Deardorff (1986) and lobby contribution data from Gawande 
(1995). Our study is based on a more aggregate data set (23 two-digit industries). But, in addition to the 
NTB measure, it relies heavily on the effective rate of protection that gauges the height of trade barriers 
in Turkey more closely. The study also benefits from import price elasticity estimates based on longer 
time-series and more recent econometric techniques that raise the precision of the estimates. Indeed, in 
contrast to the studies of the US trade policy, we find that import demand elasticity substantially 
contributes to the explanatory power of the model. Another aspect of our study is that it considers a 
country with a different institutional environment, which raises new issues and helps broaden the 
perspective on the theory and empirics of trade policy.  
Our methodology departs from those of GM and GB in an important way. Rather than focusing 
on lobby presence, we use a variety of factors to measure the value of an industry's rent to the politicians. 
As we argue below, while an organized lobby is an important element among these factors, politicians 
can benefit from policy-induced rents through other mechanisms as well—e.g., taxation, regulatory 
redistribution, and provision of social insurance. This generalization is important because it helps 
integrate the Grossman-Helpman model of lobby-driven trade policy with earlier empirical studies that   
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have found correlation between trade restrictions and a host of industry characteristics.
2 Grossman and 
Helpman (1994) focus on the role of lobbies and abstract from other factors that affect the politicians' 
valuation of industry rents. Accordingly, in their regressions, GM and GB make the coefficient of output-
import ratio a function of an indicator of lobby presence. They use the estimated coefficient to derive the 
value that politicians place on lobby contributions and find it to be surprisingly small.
3 The results are 
difficult to reconcile with the levels of protectionism one observes. Part of the problem may lie in the 
difficulty of constructing lobby indicators because all industries have some form of organization and 
contribute to politicians. So, determining whether some industries can be considered "unorganized" and 
whether the contributions of the organized ones are targeted toward trade policy are cumbersome 
matters.
4 The task is further complicated by the fact that lobby formation and the extent of contribution 
are typically endogenous.  
Taking account of channels other than lobbying that make policy-induced rents valuable to the 
politicians can help resolve these issues. The value of industry rents would no longer be confined to 
political contributions, which may indeed have a small weight in policy decisions. Moreover, to the 
extent that variation in lobby influence on policy comes from other underlying characteristics, one may 
be able to carry out reasonable estimations of trade policy equation without a lobby indicator, which is 
difficult to define for most countries in any case. GM and GB do incorporate other factors in some of 
their regressions. But, they treat those factors differently from the lobby indicator and include them as 
linear, rather than interactive, terms. They find some of those factors to be significant, but the 
interpretation of the results proves difficult because the variables have no explicit role in the theoretical 
model that guides their econometric work.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 below develops the theoretical model that specifies 
the equations to be estimated. Section 3 describes the empirical model and the data. Section 4 presents 
and discusses the estimation results. Section 4 concludes. 
                                                       
2 Prominent examples of empirical work on trade policy include: Caves (1976), Ray (1981a, 1981b), Finger, Hall, 
and Nelson (1982), Marvel and Ray (1983, 1985), Baldwin (1985), Anderson and Baldwin (1987), Leamer (1990), 
Trefler (1993), Pack (1994), and Lee and Swagel, (1997). 
3 GM find that politicians value a dollar of lobby contributions less than 1/50 of a dollar of aggregate welfare. In GB, 
the corresponding estimate is less than 1/1751. 
4 In both studies, the estimation results imply that almost all the population must be politically organized, while the 
lobby dummy variables that they construct assume that about two-thirds of industries are organized.   
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2. A Model of Trade and Industrial Policy
5 
In this section, we build a model of trade and industrial policy in which the politicians in charge 
of the government use various policy instruments to influence the resource and rent allocation in an 
industry that produces tradables. The industry faces a given world price, pw, for its product. The 
government controls the extent of competition the industry faces from abroad by setting tariff and non-
tariff trade barriers whose tariff-equivalent is t, so that the domestic price reaches p = pw + t and the 
industry's rate of protection is t/pw. A negative value of t represents an import subsidy. We will refer to t 
as a "tariff," although it may be a tax, a subsidy, a quota premium, an anti-dumping "injury payment," or 
a bribe or political contribution paid by traders to the politicians in charge of the government. To keep 
things simple, we abstract from the choice between various forms of transfer between the traders and the 
government and assume that all tariff dollars have the same composition. 
Let the number of firm in the industry be N and, for simplicity, assume they are identical. Also, 
assume that N is exogenously given, although this assumption has no impact on the form of the trade 
policy equation to be estimated (see below).
6 In order to produce, each firm needs one unit of a sector-
specific capital and labor (which represents other general factors as well). The production function of a 
firm is summarized as x(l) = Al
1-a, where A is a productivity factor, l is the amount labor employed by 
the firm, and a˛(0,1) is a parameter. As in Grossman and Helpman (1994), we assume that there is a 
constant-returns-to-scale activity in the economy that requires labor alone with an input-output 
coefficient equal to 1. Letting the price of the output from this activity be the numeraire, the labor supply 
will be perfectly elastic at a wage rate equal to 1. This allows us to write the profit of a firm as  
(2.1) p = px - l, 




A firm's profit then becomes p = apx, which implies that a can be interpreted as the share of capital of in 
output.  
Let the domestic demand for the product be denoted by D(p), which is unbounded at p = 0, 
remains bounded and continuously declines with p in the range (0, t0 + pw), t0 > 0, and equals zero for all 
                                                       
5 The model developed here builds on Esfahani and Mahmud (1999) who examine various assumptions and aspects 
of such models. Some of the details are left out here to keep the paper short.  
6 See Esfahani and Mahmud (1999) for an analysis of this claim.   
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p ‡ t0 + pw. The difference between the domestic demand and the total domestic supply, Nx, is imports: M 
= D - Nx. The consumer surplus, ￿
¥
p du u D ) ( , together with industry profits, Np, and tariff revenues 
(including NTB premia), tM, comprise the aggregate social welfare:  
(2.3) W =￿
¥
p du u D ) (  +Np + tM. 
The politicians are interested in aggregate social welfare because it brings them broad political 
support and holds back opposition. However, tariff revenues and industry profits that can be generated 
and controlled through trade policy may be more valuable to them because such rents can be directed 
toward more specific goals that offer them additional political or economic benefits. These additional 
benefits could be purely social. For example, in the absence of perfect insurance markets, increased 
profits may mitigate the risks faced by small and vulnerable firms. Profits also contribute to tax proceeds, 
which together with tariff revenues, augment budgetary resources that can be allocated to valuable public 
goods or can provide an opportunity to reduce other socially more costly taxes.
7 The benefits may also be 
more particularistic. This includes receiving part of the industry rents in the form of political 
contributions, collecting taxes that can be spent on politically rewarding projects, and redistributing 
industry rents through regulatory mechanisms to buy political support. Politicians may also have more 
direct interests in the generated rents through personal transfers and bribes (to the extent that such 
practices are feasible). Personal benefits may also be gained indirectly by first shifting rents to the 
government treasury through taxes and tariffs and then using the public funds for patronage or 
corruption. Note that it is not just industry rents and tariff that are valuable for the politicians in these 
ways. NTB premia can also perform the same functions: politicians may find the redistribution of NTB 
premia a useful tool for political or economic gain.  
We normalize the politicians' utility unit to one dollar of consumer welfare and let their valuations 
of industry profit and tariff revenue dollars be t > 1 and q > 1, respectively. We differentiate between the 
valuations of these two sources of rent because the costs of controlling and targeting those rents may be 
different for profits and tariff revenues. Given this parameterization, the government's objective function 
can be written as: 
                                                       
7 Note that we are abstracting from the impact of tax and regulatory redistribution on the production decision. In 
other words, we are treating such redistributions as lump-sum transfers. However, complicating the model by taking 




p du u D ) (  + tNp + qtM. 
The first-order condition for the government's choice of t  yields: 
(2.5) Gt = -D +qM + tNx - qmMt/pw = 0,  
where m = -(pw/M)(¶M/¶pw) is the elasticity of import demand with respect to world price. When a 












where z = Nx/M is the ratio of domestic output to competing imports and is inversely related to the import 
penetration ratio, commonly defined as m = M/D. We will refer to z simply as "output-import ratio." 
Equation (2.6) can be seen as a generalization of the tariff equation derived in Grossman and 
Helpman (1994). If we set q = 1, we find mt/pw = (t-1)z, which in essence captures the Grossman-
Helpman result with t -1 corresponding to a term in their equation that reflects the value that politicians 
attach to lobby contributions adjusted by the presence of a lobby and the share of population that it 
represents. In their model, when a lobby exists, t > 1 and output-import ratio is positively related to 
mt/pw, while in absence of a lobby, t < 1 and the association between z and mt/pw is positive. This is 
indeed the property that GM and GB test. Our interpretation of t is broader and includes the political 
value attached to all forms of benefits that politicians may derive from industry rents (taxation, 
regulatory redistribution, bribes, etc.). We posit that variations in t stem from industry characteristics 
that determine the structure of benefits that can be derived from its rents. Accordingly, we specify t as a 
function of such characteristics. We also let q be different from 1.  
Note that (2.6) seems to contradict the repeated empirical observation that the rate of protection, 
t/pw, is positively related to import penetration because z = (1-m)/m (Rodrik, 1995). However, this is not 
necessarily the case since the import price elasticity, m, is not exogenous and varies along with other 
variables:  







pw [(1+z)eDp + zexp], 
                                                                                                                                                                           
fact, given the exogeneity assumption about the industry-specific capital, simple schemes such as proportional 
taxation of profits do not have any impact on production in our model.    
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where eDp is the price elasticity of demand and exp = (1-a)/a is the elasticity of supply. Indeed, one can 
show that as long as t is sufficiently large relative to q, z and t/pw have a negative relationship, which 
means a positive correlation between m and t/pw (Esfahani and Mahmud, 1999). For example, if q = t, 








z z xp Dp + e + e
q -
.  
This equation implies that after controlling for demand and supply elasticities, the rate of protection is 
inversely associated with z. Such a relationship exists as long as t is not too small relative to q. 
The focus of our empirical work is the estimation of equation (2.6). The next section discusses 
the empirical specification of the model and the relationship of q and t with industry characteristics.  
3. Industry Characteristics and Political Preferences: Empirical Specification 
The variable that we want to explain is the protection rate, t/pw. The left-hand side of equation 
(2.6) is the interaction of t/pw with m. We keep mt/pw as the dependent variable, rather than dividing both 
sides by m, because this keeps the right hand-side simpler and avoids the endogeneity problem of m, 
pointed out above. On the right-hand side, we have a non-linear expression in z and the determinants of t 
and q. The extent of this non-linearity may be reduced by noting that parameter q is likely to be relatively 
similar across industries because a dollar of tariff revenue or quota premium per se should have the same 
value to the politicians irrespective of the commodity import that generates it. There may, of course, be 
some differences in the ease of collecting tariffs or generating quota premia across products, but these 
differences are likely to be small and unrelated to the characteristics of industries, which typically show 
up as the main determinants of protection. We test this assumption by exploiting the fact that in (2.6), 1/q 
appears by itself as an interaction with the output-import ratio, z. We examine whether the variables that 
interact with z show any significance when entered directly along with the interactive term. If they do 
not, then our assumption that q does not vary much across industries remains reasonable and does not 
bias the results. 
To prepare for the estimation of the model, we need to address two other issues. First, we must 
deal with the endogeneity of z. For this purpose, we follow the rest of the literature by viewing z as a 
function of factor shares (specifically, the shares of capital and labor in output) among others, including 
the protection rate. Factor shares are correlated with the output-import ratio because they indicate how 
well an industry matches the country's comparative advantage and, therefore, how well it can compete   
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against imports independent of the policies applied to it.
8 There is, of course, some concern that 
protection rate may affect factor shares. But, that effect is generally considered to be secondary. 
Certainly, no such concern would exist if the production processes can be closely approximated by the 
Cobb-Douglas functional form. Assuming that this is the case, we use the 2SLS method to estimate (2.6). 
Because z enters non-linearly on the right-hand side of (2.6), we use capital and labor shares and their 
interaction with the determinants of t as instruments of the 2SLS estimation.  
The second issue is the specification of t, which measures the value of industry rents relative to 
consumer surplus from the policymakers' point of view. The observable industry variables that may shape 
the relative value of industry rents to the politicians and for which we have data are: number of firms, 
sales, production, value added, employment, four-firm concentration ratio, values of exports and 
competing imports, wage bill, value of work subcontracted, raw materials cost, and other input costs. The 
values of these variables except concentration ratio and exports and imports are available separately for 
private and state-owned enterprises. To this list, we add a dummy indicator of industries whose product 
is mostly consumer goods (see Appendix Table A1). Our data set does not include an indicator of lobby 
presence because business associations in Turkey span across industries and firms typically find it more 
beneficial to engage in individualized rent-seeking (Bugra, 1994). Variation in the success of such 
activities across industries is either idiosyncratic, which must be left to the error term, or systematic, 
which must be captured in industry characteristics such as those that we include in our empirical study. 
To begin with, we expect the consumer-good dummy to have a positive impact on t and, 
therefore, display a positive coefficient in its interaction with z in the estimated equation. The reason is 
that rents generated in intermediate goods industries through protection come at the cost of lower rents in 
downstream industries and, therefore, are likely to be less valuable (have lower t) than the rents in 
consumer-good industries that are paid by consumers, who are rarely organized to impose a similar cost 
on policymakers. Indeed, studies that examine the effect of consumer-goods share on protection often 
find it to be positive (Ray, 1981a; Marvel and Ray, 1983).  
Export-orientation of an industry (measured by export share in sales) acts in the opposite 
direction of the consumer-good dummy. Protecting export-oriented industries tends to benefit only part 
of the production units in the industry and may require subsidies that impose a cost on the government 
budget, rather than generating revenues. In addition, such industries tend to have a larger intra-industry 
trade component and face a stronger threat of foreign retaliation (Finger, Hall, and Nelson, 1982; Lee and 
                                                       
8 In our model, the effects of comparative advantage are captured in the productivity factor, A.   
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Swagel, 1997; Treffler, 1993). All these effects work in the direction of lowering t for the rents 
generated in industries with larger export share in sales. 
Industry size, measured in various ways, has been viewed as another important determinant of 
protection rate. But, the direction of the theoretical effects and the reasoning behind them have varied. 
Some have argued that larger industries with more firms and workers face more challenging collective 
action problems; hence industry influence on policymakers and protection should decline with industry 
size (Trefler, 1993). Others have suggested that larger industries are politically more important and 
receive more protection (Finger, Hall, and Nelson, 1982; Lee and Swagel, 1997). The empirical evidence 
on the issue has accordingly been mixed, with each study finding results matching its claim. It should be 
noted that some of the earlier empirical findings might have been biased due to the potential endogeneity 
of industry size, especially when size is measured by the share of domestic value added, which is directly 
affected by variations in import restrictions. Another source of bias is lack of control for the import price 
elasticity, m. As the discussion at the end of section 2 makes it clear, an increase in N is likely to decrease 
import penetration and raise m, hence lowering t. Once one controls for m and z, industry size can affect 
protection rate only if it influences the political value of a dollar of industry rent. This is the effect that 
we examine by experimenting with various measures of industry size (share in total number of firms, 
employment, and value added) included in the expression for t. We use interactions of factor shares with 
other industry characteristics are less likely to be affect by the protection rate to instrument for the size 
measures. 
In the literature on collective action, it is often suggested that the presence of a few players with 
large stakes may help facilitate coordination and generate results favorable to the interest group. In the 
context of trade models, this has been taken to imply that more concentrated industries are politically 
more influential and, therefore, enjoy higher protection. However, as Caves (1976) has suggested, 
concentration of the policy-induced rents in the hands of few firms may reduce the value of industry rents 
to politicians, who are interested in broader political support. In addition, concentrated industries may be 
more effective in defending their rents against political redistribution and, thus, reduce the politicians' 
interest in generating rents for such industries in the first place. These theoretical ambiguities have their 
counterpart in the empirical record. While Trefler (1993) observes a positive relationship, Caves (1976), 
Ray (1981a, 1981b), Finger, Hall, and Nelson (1982) and Anderson and Baldwin (1987) find the 
opposite. On the other hand, in Pack's (1994) study of Indonesian trade policy, concentration shows little 
significance. We consider the four-firm concentration ratio in our regressions to see whether the theory-
based specification and Turkish data generate support for either side of this controversy.   
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Average firm size and capital intensity may also be viewed as indicators of political importance 
of firms and their rents for the politicians. However, these measures have frequently produced negative 
coefficients in studies of US trade policy. As a result, some scholars have suggested that firm size and 
capital intensity reflect barriers to entry, which may reduce the need for protection (Trefler, 1993). But, 
this view overlooks the fact that protection from foreign competition may be even more valuable to the 
existing firms in an industry if they do not have to worry about rent erosion due to domestic entry. We 
feel that the bias of protection in favor of smaller and less capital-intensive firms may be better explained 
by the concern of politicians over the vulnerability of such firms to external shocks. In the absence of 
perfect insurance markets, larger firms with more capital can weather fluctuations in foreign competition 
much more easily than smaller firms with less capital. As a result, there may be an unmet demand for 
insurance among the latter group of firms that politicians can partially address through protectionist 
policies in exchange for political support. We find support for this view, especially when we differentiate 
between state-owned and private enterprises. Since politicians can more easily deal with the vulnerability 
of SOEs through budgetary means, firm size and capital intensity should matter less in an industry where 
the smaller and less capital-intensive firms are state owned.
9 Confirmation of this effect strengthens the 
case for the risk-mitigating role of trade barriers. We use output, value added, and employment per firm 
as measures of firm size and share of capital in output as the measure of capital intensity. (Unfortunately, 
we do not have reliable measures of capital stock to use capital-labor or capital output ratios for 
measuring capital intensity.)  
Many empirical studies have found the protection rate to be inversely related to the average wage 
rate (Finger, Hall, and Nelson, 1982; Marvel and Ray, 1983; Pack, 1994; Lee and Swagel, 1997). These 
studies recognize that there may be some simultaneity between wages and protection. But, one expects 
any feedback from protection to wages to be positive. As a result, the negative impact of the wage rate on 
protection is likely to be even larger than the estimates indicate. The finding has often been viewed as 
evidence that protection is applied in favor of industries that suffer from inefficiency and comparative 
disadvantage. But, there is no robust theoretical reason as to why this should be the case (Rodrik, 1995). 
The view also faces a challenge when confronted with Lee and Swagel's (1997) observation that when 
                                                       
9 There is an interesting connection between this view of protection and the strong evidence that more open 
economies have larger governments. As Rodrik (1998) shows, governments of more open economies tend to increase 
their expenditure as a way of providing insurance for their producers. Our claim is that part of the insurance can be 
provided through trade barriers, which are used less for this purpose when there are more direct channels available 
for serving the same purpose. State ownership is an obvious channel of this kind that allows the government to use its 
expenditure for insurance purposes instead of applying protection.    
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one controls for the wage effect, protection tends to be higher in industries with higher value added per 
worker. An explanation for the wage-protection relationship may be found in the median voter model or 
the Peltzman-Becker theory of regulation, both of which suggest that redistribution from workers who are 
in rent-earning positions to the less fortunate ones may be rewarding for the politicians. In particular, 
Peltzman's (1976) analysis implies that when workers in an industry are well organized and manage to 
maximize their wage premia, a small reduction in their wage rate should have a second-order effect on 
their rents. On the other hand, raising the wage rate of workers who do not earn such premia can lead to a 
first-order rise in their welfare. Politicians may not be able to exploit this arbitrage directly, so they may 
opt to use trade policy for this purpose and favor industries with lower wage rates relative to worker 
productivity. The risk-mitigating view of trade policy discussed above can also offer a coherent 
explanation of the observed facts complementary to Peltzman's theory. Politicians may be using trade 
policy to protect the workers whose incomes fall relative to their productivity. Given our earlier argument 
that state ownership tends to reduce the need for redistribution through trade policy, both views suggest 
that the effect of low relative wage must diminish when it is SOEs that are paying such wages. We test 
these claims by including two variables in the expression for t: (1) the ratio of wage rate to value added 
per worker in the industry as a whole and (2) the wage-productivity ratio among the SOEs in the industry 
relative to the industry average. The risk-mitigating and Peltzman-Becker theories predict the first 
variable to carry a negative sign and the second one, a positive sign.  
Since endogeneity is a concern about the wage rate and some other variables included in the t 
expression, as pointed out earlier we use interactions of factor shares with industry characteristics that 
are more likely to be independent as instruments. We also use a version of the Hausman test proposed by 
Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) to examine the significance of endogeneity for various variables. The 
following section describes the data and the next one discusses the estimation results.  
4. Data  
The data for the variables of the 23 two-digit industries included in our estimation are provided 
in the Appendix Table A1.
10 Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics. The data represents the situation 
in 1988 after Turkey had gone through a major trade policy change. The imports competing with these 
                                                       
10 We also have data for an additional industry, "beverages." But, there seems to be some problems with that data. 
Among other peculiarities, the price elasticity of imports turns out to have the wrong sign and the effective rate of 
protection is -169.21, which far away from the 0 to 6.6 range for other industries. Because of these problems, we 
decided to discard that observation.    
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industries are close to 90% of Turkey's total imports; hence the sample covers a wide range of industries 
directly affected by trade policy. The sources and the nature of measures used in this data set are as 
follows.  
To measure protection rates, we use the effective rates of protection (ERP) provided by Togan 
(1996) and NTB coverage ratios available from the data set of Lee and Swagel (1997). NTB coverage 
ratio represents the share of an industry's competing imports that are subject to some form of non-tariff 
trade barrier. As a result, the ratio ranges between 0 and 1. Although to some extent this variable 
indicates the height of the protection wall, it is an imperfect measure. Moreover, as Table A1 shows, 
practically there are only three industries in our sample that have an NTB coverage ratio less than one. 
As a result, the NTB coverage ratio is not very informative about trade policy in Turkey and we rely 
mostly on ERP to gauge variations in trade policy across industries. Nevertheless, there may be some 
useful information in NTB coverage ratios. To exploit that information, we formed weighted averages of 
ERP and NTB by first multiplying NTB by 1.5, which makes its sample average equal to that of ERP and 
then applying weights to them that add up to one. In the next section, we report the results for case where 
the applied weights are equal (which means that the protection rate measure is calculated as 
0.5ERP+0.75NTB). As it will become clear, varying the weight does not have much effect on the results. 
Although NTB is a censored variable, we do not apply the limited dependent variable techniques to the 
regressions that include NTB because overwhelming share of variation comes from ERP, which is an 
unlimited variable. We also experiment with the nominal tariff rates from Togan (1996) and Krueger and 
Aktan (1992).
11  
Data on the values of merchandise imports and exports in terms of current U.S. dollars were 
obtained from United Nations Trade SITC Revision 1 Database for 3-digit SITC commodity groupings. 
We used the parallel exchange rate from IMF's Financial Statistics Yearbook to convert domestic import 
and export values into domestic currency. The export share variable was formed by dividing the value of 
exports by the total sales of each industry. The measure for the output import ratio, z, was created as the 
ratio of the value of domestic production to imports competing with each industry. The data for industry 
sales, employment, number of firms per industry, input, output, value added, and input and factor costs 
all came from Turkey’s State Institute of Statistics (Annual Statistical Compendiums, various years). 
                                                       
11 Tariff rates are reported inclusive of customs duties, municipality, wharf and production taxes, stamp duties, 
guarantee deposits and charges for Turkey's Support Price and Stabilization Fund.   
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These data distinguish between private and public firms.
12 Four-firm concentration ratios were obtained 
from the State Planning Organization, Republic of Turkey.  
Finally, the data for price elasticity of import demand, m, is based on Esfahani and Leaphart 
(1999). We use the short-run (one-year) price elasticity estimates offered by that study because in the 
model, m is defined as the import price elasticity for a given level of specific assets and such assets can 
be reasonably assumed fixed for periods of one year or so.
13 All the elasticity estimates have the correct 
sign  (positive according to our definition) except the one for petroleum and coal products, which is an 
insignificant number with the wrong sign. Since Turkey does not have much oil and coal resources of its 
own, its demand for energy imports is almost the same as the domestic demand, which tends to be 
relatively inelastic in the short run. Therefore, it is seems reasonable to assume that the true import price 
elasticity for oil and coal products is very small. We replaced that elasticity estimate with a positive 
number very close to zero. We experimented with different small values and with dropping the 
observation altogether. None of the experiment showed any major change in the results. Here we only 
report the estimates that include the petroleum and coal industry with m = 0.01.  
 
                                                       
12 In three industries (namely, furniture and fixtures, fur and leather, and rubber products), the data does not 
distinguish between public and private firms. In order to retain these industries in regressions that involved public 
firms variables, we replaced missing values of those variables with sample averages. 
13 Fixed specific assets is assumed in the model of section 2. But, the result applies when asset formation is 
endogenous but subject to government interventions through industrial policies (Esfahani and Mahmud, 1999).   
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Table 1 
 Summary Statistics of Variables Included in Estimation 
Variable  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
m m    1.1201  0.7552  -0.0760  3.2190 
ERP  1.3871  1.5354  0.0002  6.5791 
Nominal Tariff Rate  0.5726  0.2290  0.2310  1.0100 
NTB  0.9161  0.2523  0.0250  1.0000 
z  85.0366  371.8901  0.1412  1790.4890 
Consumer Good Dummy  0.3043  0.4705  0.0000  1.0000 
Export Share in Sales  0.1840  0.1535  0.0149  0.5767 
Log(Share of Employment)  -3.7659  1.1906  -5.4771  -1.5575 
Concentration Ratio  0.4381  0.1627  0.2010  0.9508 
Log(VA per Firm)  -0.2539  0.8702  -1.8249  1.1403 
Capital Share in Output  0.2917  0.08.44  0.1271  0.4600 
Labor Share in Output  0.0774  0.0312  0.0123  0.1531 
Log(Wage Rate Relative to Sample Average)  -0.0159  0.2719  -0.5137  0.4861 
Log(VA per Worker)  -0.1005  0.5234  -0.9949  1.1817 
Log(Share of SOEs in Employment)  2.9854  0.9438  0.4824  4.0587 
Log(Share of SOEs in No. of Firms)  1.6225  0.9464  -0.4005  2.9497 
Log(SOE VA per Firm Rel. to Ind. Ave.)  0.8385  0.7569  -0.8825  2.6629 
SOE Capital Share in Output Rel. to Ind. Ave.  0.8648  0.2657  0.4004  1.4476 
SOE Labor Share in Output Rel. to Ind. Ave.  2.0689  0.7993  0.7832  4.1417 
Log(SOE Wage Rate Rel. to Ind. Ave.)  0.0141  0.2100  -0.5845  0.2778 
Log(SOE VA per Worker Rel. to Ind. Ave.)  -0.5243  0.4542  -1.5022  0.1594 
 
5. Analysis of the Estimation Results 
Tables 2a and 2b summarize the results of estimation with different specifications. Some of the 
variables discussed in section 3 are not shown in these tables because they either did not display much 
significance when included among the right-hand side variables or were merely alternative measures for 
the variables already included. We will discuss the implications of the experiments with such variables 
below.   
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We begin the presentation of the results with column (1) of Table 2a where we report the OLS 
regression of ERP (without the import price elasticity weight) on measures of import penetration (output-
import ratio, z), consumer-good dummy, export orientation (export share in sales), concentration ratio, 
firm size (log of value added per firm), capital intensity (capital share in output), and the wage-
productivity effect (log of wage-labor productivity ratio). Separating wage and productivity variables 
produces statistically significant coefficients of almost equal size with opposite signs for the two 
variables in all regressions. Given the implications of the Peltzman-Becker and risk-mitigation theories 
and given the need for parsimony in estimation, we focus on the combined form of the two variables. 
Wald tests for this restriction sanction such a specification. Using alternate measures of firm size (output 
per firm or employment per firm) does not change the results in any substantial way. Measures of 
industry size do not show much statistical significance and are not included in the reported regressions.  
Although the benchmark model of column (1) accounts for more than 60 percent of the variation 
in the protection rate, its explanatory power as indicated by the adjusted R
2 is limited. Moreover, among 
the included variables only three—namely, consumer-good dummy, firm size, and the wage-productivity 
ratio—reach tangible levels of statistical significance. The regression may also exaggerate the power of 
the benchmark model because its does not deal with the potential endogeneity problem of some of the 
variables. In any event, the signs of the coefficient from this preliminary estimation indicate that trade 
policy tends to protect consumer good producers, smaller firms, and workers with low wages relative to 
their productivity. These observations agree with many earlier findings in the contexts of other countries. 
They support the view that insurance concerns and the Peltzman-Becker effects may play central roles in 
the structure of trade policy. They also indicate that the rent tradeoff in protection of intermediate goods 
is important. 
 As a second step, we examine the role played by the presence SOEs in the industry. As discussed 
in section 3, inclusion of SOE variables can particularly shed light on the relevance of the risk-mitigation 
view of trade policy. We are also interested to see whether such variables can enhance the explanatory 
power of the model. To these ends, we extend the benchmark model to include variables that show the 
relative position of SOEs in each industry: shares of SOEs in output, value added, and employment and 
the average capital share, size, and wage-productivity ratio of SOEs relative to the corresponding 
industry averages. Among these variables, only the last three proved resilient and these are the ones that 
we show at the bottom of Table 2a.
14 Model (2) is again estimated by OLS and does not deal with 
                                                       
14 We do not have share of SOEs in industry exports or other characteristics to examine the role of SOEs in 
additional dimensions.   
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endogeneity problems. It signifies the value of considering the differential roles of SOEs because the new 
variables improve the fit of the regression. In particular, export share that was previously insignificant 
now proves more consequential with a negative effect on trade barriers. It is important to keep in mind 
that any feedback from trade policy to the relative position of SOEs is likely to be smaller than the 
feedbacks to variables such as wage rate and firm size. As a result, the improvement in fit of the model is 
unlikely to be caused by reverse causation from protection to SOE variables. 
 The estimated coefficients of relative firm size, capital share, and wage-productivity ratio of 
SOEs indicate that state-ownership tends to diminish the Turkish politicians' preference for redistributing 
rents through trade policy in favor of workers earning lower relative wages and smaller firms with lower 
capital intensity. This result survives the changes in specification and estimation that we introduce 
below. The findings support the view that when politicians have more direct control over firms, they may 
provide insurance to their constituencies more effectively through mechanisms other than trade policy. 
 We proceed by addressing the endogeneity issue in the regressions. Model (3) is a re-estimation 
of model (2) with instruments used for z, value added per firm, and the wage-productivity ratio. The 
instrument for z is labor share in output and the one for the wage-productivity ratio is the interaction of 
labor share with the relative SOE wage-productivity ratio. For firm size, we provide instruments by 
interacting the concentration ratio with labor and capital shares. As pointed out earlier, factor shares are 
commonly believed to be relatively exogenous to trade policy. Also, the concentration ratio is likely to 
remain relatively unaffected by feedback effects from trade policy. The independence of the indicators of 
SOEs' relative position in each industry is reasonable in the context of Turkish economy during the late 
1980s because there had been little change in SOE conditions during the decade when trade policy 
underwent major changes.  
 The coefficients of the variable for which we are instrumenting in model (3) are likely to be 
suffering from an upward bias in the OLS estimation because higher trade barriers are likely to raise 
domestic output-import ratio, value added per firm, and the average wage rate. Since these variables have 
negative coefficients in model (2), the application of IV method should make the coefficients more 
negative. This is, indeed, the case for the three variables, whereas the coefficients of the other variables 
all rise. This observation suggests that the instruments are working in the right direction. Other than this, 
the estimation results are not very different from what we had in model (2) except that using instruments, 
naturally, reduces R
2 and the significance levels of the estimated coefficients.   
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Table 2a 
Estimation Results: Linear Model 
(p-Value Given in Italics Below Each Coefficient Estimate) 
Model  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent Variable  ERP  ERP  ERP  mERP 
Method  OLS  OLS  IV  IV 
R
2  0.6231  0.7386  0.6597  0.7996 
Adjusted R
2  0.4473  0.5209  0.3761  0.6326 
Constant  0.1677  -4.2740  -6.4960  -19.7128 
  0.9256  0.2602  0.2538  0.1218 
z  -0.0009  -0.0002  -0.0005  0.0007 
  0.2538  0.7706  0.7847  0.8708 
Consumer-Good Dummy  2.7099  4.4087  4.6599  17.2371 
  0.0085  0.0022  0.0120  0.0003 
Export Share in Sales  -4.0573  -7.5096  -8.0936  -36.4989 
  0.1633  0.0284  0.0493  0.0007 
Concentration Ratio  0.3720  1.0664  1.9249  10.4780 
  0.8668  0.6548  0.5068  0.1139 
Log(VA per Firm)  -1.0204  -1.3168  -2.1014  -6.5140 
  0.0342  0.0102  0.0442  0.0078 
Capital Share in Output  3.6357  0.6084  2.3872  -5.2205 
  0.3679  0.8801  0.6715  0.6712 
Log(Wage Rate/VA per Worker)  -3.1721  -4.4270  -5.5215  -21.8381 
  0.0148  0.0196  0.0433  0.0015 
Log(SOE VA per Firm/Industry    0.8250  0.9712  4.1982 
VA per Firm)    0.1158  0.1296  0.0074 
SOE Capital Share in Output/    3.0365  3.8243  10.1405 
Industry Capital Share in 
Output    0.2531  0.3731  0.2834 
Log[(SOE Wage /Labor Prod.)/    3.3413  4.2143  15.0586 
(Industry Wage/Labor Prod.)]    0.0581  0.1317  0.0214 
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Table 2b 
Estimation Results: Non-Linear Model 
(p-Value Given in Italics Below Each Coefficient Estimate) 
Model  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Dependent Variable  ERP  mERP  m(0.5ERP+0.75NTB) m(Nom. Tariff) 
Method  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS 
R
2  0.7308  0.9598  0.9483  0.6911 
Adjusted R
2  0.5064  0.9262  0.9052  0.6616 
Constant  1.1503  0.5870  0.7222  0.4412 
  0.0416  0.3685  0.1061  0.0761 
z  -0.8582  -2.4272  -1.5128  -0.1066 
  0.0647  0.0015  0.0024  0.6309 
z*(Consumer-Good Dummy)  0.6945  2.4211  1.5059  0.3095 
  0.0014  0.0000  0.0000  0.0010 
z*(Export Share in Sales)  -1.6020  -6.0571  -3.9596  -0.8853 
  0.0497  0.0000  0.0000  0.0138 
z*(Concentration Ratio)  -0.0522  2.0366  1.1054  0.3964 
  0.9416  0.0299  0.0699  0.2145 
z*Log(VA per Firm)  -0.2721  -0.9079  -0.4045  -0.0549 
  0.0307  0.0000  0.0003  0.2449 
z*(Capital Share in Output)  -0.1763  -1.6277  -1.1856  -0.4058 
  0.8064  0.0595  0.0419  0.1791 
z*Log(Wage Rate/VA per   -0.6357  -3.0450  -1.7666  -0.4824 
Worker)  0.1262  0.0000  0.0001  0.0117 
z*Log(SOE VA per Firm/  0.0526  0.4626  0.3666  0.1150 
Industry VA per Firm)  0.6142  0.0066  0.0019  0.0416 
z*(SOE Capital Share in Output/  0.7776  1.5654  1.0632  -0.0403 
Ind. Capital Share in Output)  0.2011  0.0337  0.0314  0.8671 
z*Log[(SOE Wage /Labor Prod.)/  0.5255  1.7003  1.1719  0.2395 
(Industry Wage/Labor Prod.)]  0.0205  0.0001  0.0001  0.0394   
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Our next three steps consist of introducing the new elements in the theory of trade policy, namely 
the interaction of m with t/pw and z with the determinants of t. Column (4) of Table 2a reports the 
consequence of changing the dependent variable by multiplying it by m, while keeping the specification 
of the right-hand side and the instruments the same as in model (3). The purpose is to see whether the 
import price elasticity plays any role of its own in trade policy. The outcome is an endorsement of this 
aspect of the theory because the significance levels of coefficient estimates as well as the adjusted R
2 rise 
sharply. GM and GB also account for import price elasticity, but they rely on elasticity estimates that are 
very noisy and do not produce as much support for trade policy models.  
To examine the consequences interacting the determinants of t with z, in model (5) of in Table 
2b we do so while reverting to ERP (rather than mERP) as the dependent variable. For this estimation, we 
change the instruments because z, for which we need to use instruments, interacts with all other 
variables. To deal with this issue, we form an instruments list from interactions of capital and labor 
shares in output, which are the most significant determinants of z, with the consumer-good dummy, 
export share, concentration ratio, capital share, log of relative SOE value added per firm, and relative 
SOE capital share. We leave out the relative SOE wage-productivity ratio from the instrument list 
because the sample is small and additional variables bring the instruments closer to spanning entire data 
space. This means that we are also instrumenting for wage-productivity ratio as well with interaction 
terms of other characteristics. The estimations can be repeated with other SOE characteristics being 
replaced with the wage-productivity variable. The results for each variable can then be compared with the 
case when it is in the instrument list to test for endogeneity (conditional on other SOE characteristics 
being independent). We use this possibility to check whether there is a disproportionate bias in any one 
of coefficient estimates for SOE variables. The results proved robust to such tests. (Also, see below for 
further tests.)  
The outcome of model (5) is again an improvement over model (3). However, as model (6) of 
Table 2b shows, it is the inclusion of interactive terms for both m and z prescribed by the theoretical 
model that produces a quantum jump in the explanatory power of the model and in the precision of 
coefficient estimates. This we take as a clear endorsement of the theoretical insights of the new political 
economy models of trade policy. Model (6) also confirms the earlier observations about the role 
consumer vs. intermediate goods, export share, firm size, and wage-productivity ratio. However, 
concentration ratio, industry capital share, and SOE capital share relative to industry average now display 
significant coefficients as well. Concentration ratio has a positive sign, supporting the hypothesis that the 
presence of a few large firms makes it easier for politicians to benefit from industry rents. Capital   
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intensity has a negative effect on t, but only to the extent that it originates outside SOEs. This finding 
strengthens the case for the risk-mitigation hypothesis already supported by the finding that trade policy 
tends to redistribute in favor of small firms and low paid workers outside SOEs. 
 Models (7) and (8) in Table 2a show the result of estimation with 0.5ERP+0.75NTB and nominal 
tariff as the measures of protection rate. The experiment with the addition of NTB coverage ratio shows 
no change in the conclusions of the analysis. The nominal tariff model is weaker and its coefficient 
estimates display lower significance levels, but in most cases the signs remain the same. Using nominal 
tariffs, of course, poses the problem that the negative effects of protection at the intermediate stages of 
production are not incorporated into the model. 
 We carried out three further sensitivity tests. First, we were concerned that because of the small 
sample and large variations in some of the variables such as z the results may be driven by a few outliers. 
We dealt with this concern by dropping observations one at a time and watching for substantial changes 
in model (5) and model (6) estimates. The results proved robust to this test. Second, we conducted further 
endogeneity tests for SOE characteristics by using the share of raw materials in output, RMS, as a new 
independent variable. Since RMS is a determinant of z (like capital and labor shares), for each SOE 
variable s, we regressed sz on the instrument list of model (5) and the interactions of raw materials shares 
with consumer good, export share, concentration ratio, and industry capital share measures. We then 
included the residual from this regression in model (5) and tested the significance of its coefficient. This 
procedure did not reject our assumption that the relative position of SOEs in each industry can be treated 
as exogenous in the situation prevailing in Turkey during 1980s.  
The third test concerned the assumption that that q is constant across industries, which permitted 
us to reduce the non-linearity of the model. If q is a function of industry characteristics, then the term 
1-1/q, which is measured by the constant in the models of Table 2b, should vary across industries. A test 
that can falsify our maintained hypothesis is the inclusion of industry characteristics as additional linear 
terms in model (5). Because our sample is small, we add such terms one by one and use their t-statistics 
as the test score. Again, no significant coefficient was produced in these tests. 
 Finally, it is interesting to examine the values of q and t. Unfortunately, the constant is not 
estimated very accurately in models (5). But its value is close to the estimate from (6), which is 
somewhat better estimated. Using the point values from models (5) and (6) yields values of 2.4 and 3.6 
for q. This implies that politicians may be valuing a dollar of tariff revenue and quota premia about three 
times as much as a dollar of consumer welfare. The value of t is industry specific and depends on the 
estimate of q. The point estimate for (t-1)/q ranges between -0.55 and +2.93 in the two regressions. The   
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estimates are mostly clustered in the 0 to 0.5 range and yield cross-industry mean value of 0.242 in model 
(5) and 0.166 in model (6), which are not significantly different from 0. Using the point estimates of q, 
both models yields mean values of about 1.60 for t. This suggests that in the 1980s tariff revenues may 
have been valued much more than industry rents.  Although our estimates for t and q lack accuracy, the 
average values that we find seem quite realistic. It is notable that our results differ sharply from the 
almost negligible values that GM and GB find for the valuation of political contributions in the US.  
6. Concluding Remarks 
We have examined the determinants of protection rates for twenty-three industries in Turkey and 
tested a political economy model of trade policy. The specification that the model prescribes for the 
relationship between protection rate, import price elasticity, import penetration, and the determinants of 
rent valuation by politicians fits the data much better than other specifications common in the empirical 
trade policy literature. The results also strongly support the view that politicians use trade policy as a 
mechanism to deal with imperfections in insurance markets. Specifically, they seem to value policy 
induced rents more when such rents go to industries where workers are paid less relative to their 
productivity and firms are smaller and less capital intensive. The case is particularly strengthened by our 
finding that protection is reduced when such characteristics originate in SOEs, which can receive 
insurance more easily with direct means such as fiscal transfers. Industries with higher concentration, 
oriented toward domestic markets, and selling mostly to consumers also seem to be in stronger positions 
to receive protection from foreign competition.  
Our evidence from micro data concerning the importance of social insurance in trade and 
industrial policies in Turkey is closely related to Rodrik's (1998) finding that government expenditure 
rises with openness. Both studies imply that protectionism is used for mitigating international risks, 
though it is an imperfect substitute for fiscal tools. Rodrik's empirical analysis shows that governments 
that find it too costly to keep their economies closed address the insurance problem by increasing their 
expenditure. Our observations complement that result by showing that when there is an established 
mechanism for fiscal support of firms in an industry, the government has less incentive to offer 
protection from imports. These observations imply that the development of fiscal systems and the rise of 
financial and insurance institutions must have played a key role in the decline of trade barriers around the 
world during the past few half a century. The view also sheds light on the reasons behind the reluctance 
of many low-income countries with weak institutional capabilities to dismantle their protectionist walls, 
while middle-income countries have been showing greater eagerness to liberalize as their markets and 
institutions have developed. As Rodrik (1998) notes, continued move toward openness of countries to   
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international trade may require progress in fiscal systems or domestic and international institutions that 
can deal with the economic insecurities generated by globalization.  




Appendix: Table A1 
 Turkish Industry Data, 1988 
Industry  SITC Codes  Consumer 
Good  ERP  Nominal 
Tariff Rate  NTB  m m  z 
Chemicals  512 - 571, 599  0  0.6661  0.6040  0.8020  1.2840  3.8394 
Elec. Machinery  722 - 729  0  1.0994  1.0100  1  0.6270  2.1668 
Food  0 - 100, 411, 421, 422. 431, 221  1  3.4676  0.3200  0.2432  1.7010  12.8267 
Furni. & Fixtures  812, 821  1  6.5791  0.7700  1  3.2190  7.1139 
Fur & Leather  211, 212, 611 - 613  0  0.5546  0.5600  1  1.0800  0.4218 
Fabr. Metal Products  691 - 698  0  3.8868  0.7700  1  0.7900  8.2077 
Footwear  851  1  0.7482  0.4390  1  0.6880  34.2661 
Glass Products  664, 665  1  2.3868  0.7440  1  0.9120  8.6560 
Iron & Steel  281, 282, 671 - 679  0  0.5744  0.4100  1  0.0860  3.5234 
Non-Electric Machinery  711 - 719  0  1.0766  0.7100  1  0.9640  1.0402 
Non-Ferrous Metals  283, 284, 681 - 689  0  0.5969  0.4700  1  0.4650  1.5625 
Non-Met. Minerals  271, 276, 661 - 667  0  0.6451  0.3300  1  1.3770  13.1994 
Other Non-Met. Minerals  667  0  0.6451  0.3300  1  1.3180  1790.4886 
Other Manufactures  891, 894 - 899  1  0.9244  0.9100  1  0.3930  0.5834 
Petroleum & Coal  321, 331, 332  0  0.0002  0.2900  1  -0.0760  0.1412 
Plastic Products  581, 893  1  3.1020  0.6350  1  0.9490  1.7314 
Paper Products  251, 641, 642  0  0.4005  0.4100  1  1.0860  4.9409 
Printing & Publishing  892  0  0.2700  0.3560  0.0250  1.1400  33.7414 
Prof. & Scien. Equipment  861, 862, 864  0  1.0994  0.9100  1  0.7660  0.4212 
Rubber Products  231, 621, 629  0  0.6807  0.5600  1  1.1130  5.9738 
Transport Equipment  731 - 735  0  0.9900  0.8800  0.9999  2.4070  5.7465 
Textiles  261, 262, 651 - 657, 263 - 267  1  1.1450  0.5200  1  2.4560  11.2026 




Table A1 (continued) 
 Turkish Industry Data, 1988 














Wage Rate)  Log(VA per 
Worker) 
Chemicals  0.1081  -2.7858  0.5086  1.1403  0.3662  0.0450  0.3995  0.8796 
Elec. Machinery  0.1840  -3.0720  0.4939  0.0897  0.2743  0.0751  0.2117  0.1429 
Food  0.3854  -1.9738  0.3234  -0.5404  0.2187  0.0508  -0.3068  -0.3729 
Furni. & Fixtures  0.1251  -5.2202  0.2871  -1.0982  0.3871  0.0760  -0.4615  -0.3854 
Fur & Leather  0.0618  -5.4771  0.4341  -1.8249  0.1767  0.0545  -0.5137  -0.7886 
Fabr. Metal Products  0.0944  -3.1098  0.3059  -0.7030  0.3226  0.0876  -0.0664  -0.2235 
Footwear  0.1908  -5.1241  0.3969  -1.2400  0.1706  0.1531  -0.0581  -0.9949 
Glass Products  0.2287  -4.1287  0.5020  1.0640  0.4600  0.1029  0.2864  0.2624 
Iron & Steel  0.2450  -2.6898  0.3913  0.8271  0.2623  0.0510  0.2541  0.3426 
Non-Electric Machin.  0.1329  -2.8315  0.5602  -0.2709  0.2465  0.0844  0.0792  -0.1523 
Non-Ferrous Metals  0.2331  -3.7519  0.5408  0.6807  0.3722  0.0508  0.0299  0.4186 
Non-Met. Minerals  0.1403  -2.4537  0.3205  -0.0689  0.4254  0.0877  -0.0187  0.0255 
Other Non-Met. Min.  0.0241  -2.8924  0.2283  -0.4473  0.3975  0.0828  -0.0954  -0.0590 
Other Manufactures  0.5767  -5.2378  0.4579  -1.6756  0.2481  0.1134  -0.3235  -0.8625 
Petroleum & Coal  0.5358  -5.4013  0.9508  1.1293  0.1272  0.0123  0.4861  1.1817 
Plastic Products  0.3590  -4.2825  0.3027  -0.9591  0.2153  0.0494  -0.2065  -0.2338 
Paper Products  0.0621  -3.7760  0.4805  0.1484  0.3068  0.0652  -0.0952  -0.0896 
Printing & Publishing  0.0149  -4.2170  0.4361  -0.4903  0.3089  0.0949  0.1792  -0.0536 
Prof. & Scien. Equip.  0.0976  -5.4768  0.6916  -1.0093  0.3109  0.1398  -0.0056  -0.5169 
Rubber  0.0833  -4.2169  0.3851  0.0503  0.3322  0.0680  0.2527  0.2944 
Transport Equip  0.0334  -2.7371  0.5462  0.3927  0.2766  0.0789  0.1485  -0.0721 
Textiles  0.2415  -1.5575  0.2010  -0.0480  0.2651  0.0917  -0.1539  -0.4735 




Table A1 (continued) 
 Turkish Industry Data, 1988 
Industry  Share of SOEs 
in Employment 
Share of SOEs 
in No. of Firms 
Log(Rel. SOE 
VA per Firm) 
Rel. SOE Capital 
Share in Output 
Rel. SOE Labor 




VA per Worker) 
Chemicals  3.4308  2.0281  1.5487  1.2733  0.9264  -0.1420  0.1461 
Elec. Machinery  2.2343  0.8459  0.6582  0.8974  2.9402  0.1002  -0.7302 
Food  3.6198  2.9497  0.1691  0.8225  1.6841  0.0358  -0.5010 
Furni. & Fixtures  3.3131  2.0919  0.9029  0.9656  1.6436  0.0240  -0.3184 
Fur & Leather  3.3131  2.0919  0.9029  0.9656  1.6436  0.0240  -0.3184 
Fabr. Metal Products  1.9066  0.0583  1.4829  0.8474  2.0540  0.2631  -0.3654 
Footwear  3.9827  2.3026  1.4602  0.5537  1.7856  0.2591  -0.2198 
Glass Products  1.6677  0.9670  -0.8015  0.7182  2.6818  -0.5845  -1.5022 
Iron & Steel  4.0303  1.2920  2.6629  1.3097  1.6482  0.1139  -0.0754 
Non-Electric Machin.  3.2873  1.7951  0.5723  0.4932  2.6244  0.0801  -0.9198 
Non-Ferrous Metals  4.0335  1.9974  1.4210  1.0539  2.0798  -0.0452  -0.6152 
Non-Met. Minerals  1.3244  -0.2231  0.6219  0.8504  2.7559  -0.0724  -0.9256 
Other Non-Met. Min.  3.0559  1.9755  1.0903  0.8171  1.1394  0.2778  0.0098 
Other Manufactures  2.1983  0.4637  1.0403  0.4004  2.2055  0.1544  -0.6943 
Petroleum & Coal  3.2899  2.7726  -0.8825  0.8411  3.3804  -0.2427  -1.3998 
Plastic Products  0.4824  -0.4005  1.0423  1.4476  0.7832  -0.3732  0.1594 
Paper Products  4.0587  2.4493  1.0908  0.8995  1.5153  -0.1101  -0.5186 
Printing & Publishing  2.8338  2.0149  -0.0121  0.6643  2.3822  -0.0075  -0.8310 
Prof. & Scien. Equip.  3.4980  1.7156  1.3520  0.7860  2.6927  0.2641  -0.4304 
Rubber  3.3131  2.0919  0.9029  0.9656  1.6436  0.0240  -0.3184 
Transport Equip  3.3131  1.7246  0.4260  0.5530  4.1417  -0.0326  -1.1625 
Textiles  2.7285  1.3888  0.8271  0.6006  1.8731  0.2107  -0.5126 
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